White B C, Zimbelman J
Department of Philosophy, California State University at Chico, 95929-0730, USA.
J Med Philos. 1998 Aug;23(5):477-99. doi: 10.1076/jmep.23.5.477.2566.
In a recent critique of informed consent, Robert Veatch argues that the practice is in principle unable to attain the goals for which it was developed. We argue that Veatch's focus on the theoretical impossibility of determining patients' best interests is misapplied to the practical discipline of medicine, and that he wrongly assumes that the patient-physician communication fails to provide the knowledge needed to insure the patient's best interests. We further argue that Veatch's suggested alternative, value-based patient-professional pairing, is, on his own terms, impossible to implement. Finally, we reexamine the philosophical and practical justifications for informed consent and conclude that the practice should be retained.
在最近一篇关于知情同意的评论文章中，罗伯特·维奇认为，这种做法原则上无法实现其设立的目标。我们认为，维奇将重点放在确定患者最佳利益的理论不可能性上，这不适用于医学的实践学科，而且他错误地假定医患沟通无法提供确保患者最佳利益所需的知识。我们进一步认为，按照维奇自己的说法，他所建议的替代方案，即基于价值观的患者与专业人员配对，是无法实施的。最后，我们重新审视了知情同意的哲学和实践依据，并得出结论，这种做法应该保留。
