Krakauer E L
Department of Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts 02115, USA.
Theor Med Bioeth. 1998 Dec;19(6):525-45. doi: 10.1023/a:1009999909072.
My purpose is to examine two of the foundations of medical ethics: the principle of autonomy and the concept of the human. I also investigate the extent to which health technology makes autonomy and humanness possible. I begin by underlining Illich's point that the same health technology designed to promote health and autonomy also is pathogenic. I proceed to analyse the Kantian concept of autonomy, a concept which is closely associated with health and which continues to determine current ethical thinking. In so doing, I uncover an unexpected ontological function of health technology, a function described in Heidegger's work on technology. Based on this discovery, I suggest that calls for Kantian autonomy may often be self-defeating or even sometimes harmful. I conclude by calling for continued ethical vigilance, but also for a questioning of the hitherto virtually unquestionable concepts of ethics and humanness which may themselves play a role in our era's greatest problems.
自主性原则和人的概念。我还探究了健康技术在多大程度上使自主性和人性成为可能。我首先强调伊利奇的观点,即旨在促进健康和自主性的同一健康技术也具有致病性。接着我分析康德的自主性概念,这一概念与健康密切相关且仍在决定当前的伦理思考。在此过程中,我揭示了健康技术一种意想不到的本体论功能,这种功能在海德格尔关于技术的著作中有描述。基于这一发现,我认为对康德式自主性的呼吁可能常常适得其反,甚至有时是有害的。我在结论中呼吁持续保持伦理警惕,同时也对迄今为止几乎未受质疑的伦理和人性概念提出质疑,因为这些概念本身可能在我们这个时代的最大问题中发挥作用。