Anis A H, Wen Q
Health Research Centre, St. Paul's Hospital, Vancouver, B.C., Canada.
J Health Econ. 1998 Jan;17(1):21-38. doi: 10.1016/s0167-6296(97)00016-7.
Patent holding pharmaceutical firms are modeled as price-discriminating international monopolies. In an unregulated world market, firms set monopoly prices in each national market. Three types of regulatory rules: (i) 'reasonable' relationship rule, (ii) international price comparison rule, and, (iii) therapeutic class comparison rule, are examined. While price regulation may lead to lower introductory prices for new drugs, the price of existing drugs may increase. Domestic price regulation may increase foreign prices. Canadian data supported the model's predictions. Policy makers should anticipate these responses that affects the entire vector of drug prices and not just those subject to specific regulations.
持有专利的制药公司被模拟为实行价格歧视的国际垄断企业。在不受监管的世界市场中，企业在每个国家市场设定垄断价格。研究了三种监管规则：（i）“合理”关系规则，（ii）国际价格比较规则，以及（iii）治疗类别比较规则。虽然价格监管可能会导致新药的初始价格降低，但现有药品的价格可能会上涨。国内价格监管可能会提高国外价格。加拿大的数据支持了该模型的预测。政策制定者应该预见到这些会影响整个药品价格向量的反应，而不仅仅是那些受特定监管的反应。
