Brown C M, Nuorti P J, Breiman R F, Hathcock A L, Fields B S, Lipman H B, Llewellyn G C, Hofmann J, Cetron M
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Epidemiology Program Office, Division of Field Epidemiology, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA.
Int J Epidemiol. 1999 Apr;28(2):353-9. doi: 10.1093/ije/28.2.353.
From July to September 1994, 29 cases of community-acquired Legionnaires' disease (LD) were reported in Delaware. The authors conducted an investigation to a) identify the source of the outbreak and risk factors for developing Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 (Lp-1) pneumonia and b) evaluate the risk associated with the components of cumulative exposure to the source (i.e. distance from the source, frequency of exposure, and duration of exposure).
A case-control study matched 21 patients to three controls per case by known risk factors for acquiring LD. Controls were selected from patients who attended the same clinic as the respective case-patients. Water samples taken at the hospital, from eight nearby cooling towers, and from four of the patient's homes were cultured for Legionella. Isolates were subtyped using monoclonal antibody (Mab) analysis and arbitrarily primed polymerase chain reaction (AP-PCR).
Eleven (52%) of 21 case-patients worked at or visited the hospital compared with 17 (27%) of 63 controls (OR 5.0, 95% CI : 1.1-29). For those who lived, worked, or visited within 4 square miles of the hospital, the risk of illness decreased by 20% for each 0.10 mile from the hospital; it increased by 80% for each visit to the hospital; and it increased by 8% for each hour spent within 0.125 miles of the hospital. Lp-1 was isolated from three patients and both hospital cooling towers. Based on laboratory results no other samples contained Lp-1. The clinical and main-tower isolates all demonstrated Mab pattern 1,2,5,6. AP-PCR matched the main-tower samples with those from two case-patients.
The results of our investigation suggested that the hospital cooling towers were the source of a community outbreak of LD. Increasing proximity to and frequency of exposure to the towers increased the risk of LD. New guidelines for cooling tower maintenance are needed. Knowing the location of cooling towers could facilitate maintenance inspections and outbreak investigations.
1994年7月至9月,特拉华州报告了29例社区获得性军团病(LD)病例。作者开展了一项调查,以a)确定疫情源头以及感染嗜肺军团菌血清1型(Lp-1)肺炎的危险因素,b)评估累积接触源头各因素(即与源头的距离、接触频率和接触持续时间)相关的风险。
一项病例对照研究,按照已知的感染LD危险因素,为21例患者每例匹配3名对照。对照选自与各病例患者就诊于同一诊所的患者。对从医院、附近8座冷却塔以及4名患者家中采集的水样进行军团菌培养。使用单克隆抗体(Mab)分析和任意引物聚合酶链反应(AP-PCR)对分离株进行亚型分型。
21例病例患者中有11例(52%)在医院工作或前往过医院,而63名对照中有17例(27%)(比值比5.0,95%可信区间:1.1 - 29)。对于那些在距医院4平方英里范围内居住、工作或前往过的人,与医院的距离每增加0.10英里,患病风险降低20%;每次前往医院,患病风险增加80%;在距医院0.125英里范围内每停留一小时,患病风险增加8%。从3名患者以及两座医院冷却塔中分离出了Lp-1。根据实验室结果,其他样本均未含有Lp-1。临床分离株和主冷却塔分离株均显示Mab模式1、2、5、6。AP-PCR显示主冷却塔样本与两名病例患者的样本匹配。
我们的调查结果表明,医院冷却塔是此次社区LD疫情的源头。与冷却塔的距离越近以及接触频率越高,LD患病风险越高。需要制定冷却塔维护的新指南。了解冷却塔的位置有助于维护检查和疫情调查。