Szamad S
Department of Plant Taxonomy and Ecology, Eotvos Lorand University, Ludovika ter 2, Budapest, H-1083, Hungary.
J Theor Biol. 1999 Jun 21;198(4):593-602. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.1999.0935.
The validity of the handicap principle has spawned much debate in spite of the existence of a formal treatment. Simple models constructed to further investigate the issue were able both to prove and to disprove some of its claims. Here I show with the aid of a more general model, which takes into account both assumptions presented in these previous simple models: (1) that the previous results are not in conflict since they can be obtained as specific cases of this general model; (2) that ESS communication need not use costly signals, that is, even under conflict of interest, the cost of a signal used by a high-quality individual can be zero (or even negative) provided that the cost for low-quality signallers is high enough; (3) that only the cost relative to the benefits of the interaction should be higher for worse signallers; and (4) that in a discrete model the differential cost is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for evolutionarily stable reliable communication. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
尽管有正式的论述，但 handicap 原则的有效性仍引发了诸多争论。为进一步研究该问题构建的简单模型，既能证明也能反驳其一些观点。在此，我借助一个更通用的模型进行说明，该模型兼顾了此前简单模型所提出的两个假设：（1）先前的结果并不冲突，因为它们可作为此通用模型的特定情形得出；（2）ESS 通信不一定使用代价高昂的信号，也就是说，即便存在利益冲突，只要低质量信号发送者的代价足够高，高质量个体所使用信号的代价可以为零（甚至为负）；（3）对于较差的信号发送者而言，只有相对于互动收益的代价才应更高；（4）在离散模型中，差异代价只是进化稳定可靠通信的必要而非充分条件。版权所有 1999 年，学术出版社。
