Focks D A, Brenner R J, Hayes J, Daniels E
Center for Medical, Agricultural and Veterinary Entomology, US Department of Agriculture, Gainesville, Florida 32604, USA.
Am J Trop Med Hyg. 2000 Jan;62(1):11-8.
The expense and ineffectiveness of drift-based insecticide aerosols to control dengue epidemics has led to suppression strategies based on eliminating larval breeding sites. With the notable but short-lived exceptions of Cuba and Singapore, these source reduction efforts have met with little documented success; failure has chiefly been attributed to inadequate participation of the communities involved. The present work attempts to estimate transmission thresholds for dengue based on an easily-derived statistic, the standing crop of Aedes aegypti pupae per person in the environment. We have developed these thresholds for use in the assessment of risk of transmission and to provide targets for the actual degree of suppression required to prevent or eliminate transmission in source reduction programs. The notion of thresholds is based on 2 concepts: the mass action principal-the course of an epidemic is dependent on the rate of contact between susceptible hosts and infectious vectors, and threshold theory-the introduction of a few infectious individuals into a community of susceptible individuals will not give rise to an outbreak unless the density of vectors exceeds a certain critical level. We use validated transmission models to estimate thresholds as a function of levels of pre-existing antibody levels in human populations, ambient air temperatures, and size and frequency of viral introduction. Threshold levels were estimated to range between about 0.5 and 1.5 Ae. aegypti pupae per person for ambient air temperatures of 28 degrees C and initial seroprevalences ranging between 0% to 67%. Surprisingly, the size of the viral introduction used in these studies, ranging between 1 and 12 infectious individuals per year, was not seen to significantly influence the magnitude of the threshold. From a control perspective, these results are not particularly encouraging. The ratio of Ae. aegypti pupae to human density has been observed in limited field studies to range between 0.3 and >60 in 25 sites in dengue-endemic or dengue-susceptible areas in the Caribbean, Central America, and Southeast Asia. If, for purposes of illustration, we assume an initial seroprevalence of 33%, the degree of suppression required to essentially eliminate the possibility of summertime transmission in Puerto Rico, Honduras, and Bangkok, Thailand was estimated to range between 10% and 83%; however in Mexico and Trinidad, reductions of >90% would be required. A clearer picture of the actual magnitude of the reductions required to eliminate the threat of transmission is provided by the ratio of the observed standing crop of Ae. aegypti pupae per person and the threshold. For example, in a site in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, the ratio of observed and threshold was 1.7, meaning roughly that about 7 of every 17 breeding containers would have to be eliminated. For Reynosa, Mexico, with a ratio of approximately 10, 9 of every 10 containers would have to be eliminated. For sites in Trinidad with ratios averaging approximately 25, the elimination of 24 of every 25 would be required. With the exceptions of Cuba and Singapore, no published reports of sustained source reduction efforts have achieved anything near these levels of reductions in breeding containers. Practical advice on the use of thresholds is provided for operational control projects.
基于漂移的杀虫剂气雾剂控制登革热流行的成本高昂且效果不佳,这促使人们采取基于消除幼虫滋生地的抑制策略。除了古巴和新加坡这两个显著但只是短暂成功的例子外,这些减少源头的努力鲜有成功的记录;失败主要归因于相关社区的参与不足。目前的工作试图基于一个易于得出的统计数据——环境中每人埃及伊蚊蛹的现存数量,来估计登革热的传播阈值。我们已制定出这些阈值,用于评估传播风险,并为在减少源头项目中预防或消除传播所需的实际抑制程度提供目标。阈值的概念基于两个理念:质量作用原理——流行病的发展过程取决于易感宿主与感染性媒介之间的接触率,以及阈值理论——将少数感染个体引入易感个体群体中不会引发疫情,除非媒介密度超过某个临界水平。我们使用经过验证的传播模型来估计阈值,该阈值是人群中预先存在的抗体水平、环境气温以及病毒引入规模和频率的函数。对于28摄氏度的环境气温以及0%至67%的初始血清阳性率,估计阈值水平在每人约0.5至1.5只埃及伊蚊蛹之间。令人惊讶的是,这些研究中使用的病毒引入规模,即每年1至12个感染个体,并未被发现对阈值大小有显著影响。从控制的角度来看,这些结果并不特别令人鼓舞。在加勒比地区、中美洲和东南亚登革热流行或易感地区的25个地点进行的有限实地研究中,观察到埃及伊蚊蛹与人类密度的比率在0.3至60以上之间。为了举例说明,如果我们假设初始血清阳性率为33%,那么在波多黎各、洪都拉斯和泰国曼谷基本消除夏季传播可能性所需的抑制程度估计在10%至83%之间;然而在墨西哥和特立尼达,则需要减少90%以上。通过观察到的每人埃及伊蚊蛹现存数量与阈值的比率,可以更清楚地了解消除传播威胁所需减少的实际幅度。例如,在波多黎各马亚圭斯的一个地点,观察到的与阈值的比率为1.7,这大致意味着每17个滋生容器中大约有7个必须被消除。对于墨西哥雷诺萨,比率约为10,每10个容器中必须消除9个。对于特立尼达平均比率约为25的地点,每25个中必须消除24个。除了古巴和新加坡,没有已发表的关于持续减少源头努力的报告实现过接近这些滋生容器减少水平的成果。为运营控制项目提供了关于使用阈值的实用建议。