Iltis A S
Department of Philosophy, Rice Unviersity, Houston, TX 77005, USA.
J Med Philos. 2000 Jun;25(3):271-84. doi: 10.1076/0360-5310(200006)25:3;1-H;FT271.
Bioethical decision-making depends on presuppositions about the function and goal of bioethics. The authors in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy share the assumption that bioethics is about resolving cases, not about moral theory, and that the best method of bioethical decision-making is that which produces useful answers. Because we have no universally agreed upon background moral theory which can serve as the basis for bioethical decision-making, they try to move bioethics away from theory. For them, a good method of bioethical decision-making is one which resolves cases in ways that are justifiable to the parties involved, not necessarily in ways that bring us "close" to the right and the true. The authors consider how the move away from theory and toward actual cases is best accomplished. In particular, the debate in this issue is about specification, specified principlism, and casuistry.
生物伦理决策取决于关于生物伦理学功能和目标的预设。《医学与哲学杂志》本期的作者们有一个共同的假设，即生物伦理学是关于解决具体案例的，而非关于道德理论，并且生物伦理决策的最佳方法是能产生有用答案的方法。由于我们没有普遍认可的背景道德理论可作为生物伦理决策的基础，他们试图使生物伦理学远离理论。对他们而言，一种好的生物伦理决策方法是以能让相关各方认可的方式解决案例，而不一定是以让我们“接近”正确与真实的方式。作者们思考如何最好地实现从理论转向实际案例。特别是，本期的辩论围绕具体化、特定原则主义和决疑法展开。
