Fiedler K
Institute of Psychology, University of Heidelberg, Germany.
Psychol Rev. 2000 Oct;107(4):659-76. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.107.4.659.
A cognitive-ecological approach to judgment biases is presented and substantiated by recent empirical evidence. Latent properties of the environment are not amenable to direct assessment but have to be inferred from empirical samples that provide the interface between cognition and the environment. The sampling process may draw on the external world or on internal memories. For systematic reasons (proximity, salience, and focus of attention), the resulting samples tend to be biased (selective, skewed, or conditional on information search strategies). Because people lack the metacognitive ability to understand and control for sampling constraints (predictor sampling, criterion sampling, selective-outcome sampling, etc.), the sampling biases carry over to subsequent judgments. Within this framework, alternative accounts are offered for a number of judgment biases, such as base-rate neglect, confirmation bias, illusory correlation, pseudo-contingency, Simpson's paradox, outgroup devaluation, and pragmatic-confusion effects.
本文提出了一种关于判断偏差的认知生态学方法,并通过近期的实证证据加以证实。环境的潜在属性不易直接评估,而必须从提供认知与环境之间接口的实证样本中推断出来。抽样过程可能利用外部世界或内部记忆。由于系统原因(接近性、显著性和注意力焦点),所得到的样本往往存在偏差(有选择性、倾斜或取决于信息搜索策略)。因为人们缺乏理解和控制抽样限制(预测抽样、标准抽样、选择性结果抽样等)的元认知能力,所以抽样偏差会延续到后续判断中。在此框架内,针对一些判断偏差,如基础比率忽视、证实偏差、错觉相关、伪相依性、辛普森悖论、外群体贬低和语用混淆效应,提供了不同的解释。