Diener E, Wirtz D, Oishi S
Psychology Department, University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, IL 61820, USA.
Psychol Sci. 2001 Mar;12(2):124-8. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00321.
In three studies, we explored how the ending of a life influences the perceived desirability of that life. We consistently observed that participants neglected duration in judging the global quality of life. Across all the studies, the end of life was weighted heavily, producing ratings that contradict a simple hedonic calculus in which years of pleasure and pain are summed. Respondents rated a wonderful life that ended abruptly as better than one with additional mildly pleasant years (the "James Dean Effect"). Similarly, a terrible life with additional moderately bad years was rated as more desirable than one ending abruptly without those unpleasant years (the "Alexander Solzhenitsyn Effect"). Finally, embedding moderately intense years in the middle of life did not produce effects as strong as adding those years to the end of life, suggesting that a life's ending is weighted especially heavily in judging quality of life.
在三项研究中，我们探究了生命的终结如何影响人们对该生命的感知合意性。我们始终观察到，参与者在判断整体生活质量时忽略了持续时间。在所有研究中，生命的终结被赋予了极大的权重，得出的评分与简单的享乐主义计算相悖，在这种计算中，快乐和痛苦的年份被累加起来。受访者认为，突然结束的美好人生比有额外几年轻度愉悦时光的人生更好（“詹姆斯·迪恩效应”）。同样，有额外几年中度糟糕时光的糟糕人生，被认为比没有那些不愉快年份而突然结束的人生更合意（“亚历山大·索尔仁尼琴效应”）。最后，将中度强烈的年份置于生命中期所产生的影响，不如将这些年份加到生命末尾那么强烈，这表明在判断生活质量时，生命的终结被赋予的权重尤其大。
