Kuczewski M G
Neiswanger Institute for Bioethics and Health Policy, Loyola University Chicago, Maywood, IL 60153, USA.
Theor Med Bioeth. 2001;22(2):135-50. doi: 10.1023/a:1011482009875.
I consider the problem liberalism poses for bioethics. Liberalism is a view that advocates that the state remain neutral to views of the good life. This view is sometimes supported by a skeptical moral epistemology that tends to propel liberalism toward libertarianism. I argue that the possibilities for shared agreement on moral matters are more promising than is sometimes appreciated by such a view of liberalism. Using two examples of public debates of moral issues, I show that commonly shared intuitions may ground moral principles even if they may be given different weight by persons of different moral and religious traditions. Nevertheless, the fact that the intuition and principle is widely shared may be sufficient to chart some directions for public policy or cooperative action even if they do not lead to complete agreement. As a result, I argue that a liberal communitarianism that presupposes a fairly minimalist epistemology is a legitimate approach to achieving shared agreement in a pluralistic society.
我思考了自由主义给生物伦理学带来的问题。自由主义是一种主张国家对美好生活观保持中立的观点。这种观点有时得到一种怀疑主义的道德认识论的支持,这种认识论往往将自由主义推向自由意志主义。我认为,在道德问题上达成共同共识的可能性比这种自由主义观点有时所认为的更有前景。通过道德问题公开辩论的两个例子,我表明,即使不同道德和宗教传统的人可能会赋予它们不同的权重,共同的直觉也可以为道德原则奠定基础。然而,直觉和原则被广泛共享这一事实可能足以勾勒出公共政策或合作行动的一些方向,即使它们不会导致完全一致。因此,我认为,一种预先假定相当简约的认识论的自由社群主义,是在多元社会中达成共同共识的一种合理方法。