Tong R
UNC-Charlotte, NC 28223, USA.
Health Care Anal. 2001;9(2):229-46. doi: 10.1023/A:1011390521518.
In this paper I argue that a global bioethics is possible. Specifically, I present the view that there are within feminist approaches to bioethics some conceptual and methodological tools necessary to forge a bioethics that embraces the health-related concerns of both developing and developed nations equally. To support my argument I discuss some of the challenges that have historically confronted feminists. If feminists accept the idea that women are entirely the same, then feminists present as fact the fiction of the essential "Woman." Not only does "Woman" not exist, -she" obscures important racial, ethnic, cultural, and class differences among women. However, if feminists stress women's differences too much, feminists lose the power to speak coherently and cogently about gender justice, women's rights, and sexual equality in general. Analyzing the ways in which the idea of difference as well as the idea of sameness have led feminists astray, I ask whether it is possible to avoid the Scylla of absolutism (imperialism, colonialism, hegemony) on the one hand and the Charybdis of relativism (postmodernism, fragmentation, Balkanization) on the other. Finally, after reflecting upon the work of Uma Narayan, Susan Muller Okin, and Martha Nussbaum, I conclude that there is a way out of this ethical bind. By focusing on women's, children's, and men's common human needs, it is possible to lay the foundation for a just and caring global bioethics.
在本文中，我认为全球生物伦理学是可行的。具体而言，我提出这样一种观点，即在女性主义生物伦理学方法中，存在一些概念性和方法论工具，这些工具对于构建一种能平等地涵盖发展中国家和发达国家与健康相关问题的生物伦理学而言是必要的。为支持我的论点，我讨论了女性主义者在历史上面临的一些挑战。如果女性主义者接受女性完全相同这一观点，那么她们就把本质上的“女性”这一虚构概念当作了事实。“女性”不仅不存在，而且她还掩盖了女性之间重要的种族、民族、文化和阶级差异。然而，如果女性主义者过于强调女性的差异，那么她们就会失去就性别正义、妇女权利以及总体上的性平等进行连贯且有说服力发言的能力。通过分析差异观念和相同观念导致女性主义者误入歧途的方式，我提出是否有可能一方面避免绝对主义（帝国主义、殖民主义、霸权）的锡拉岩礁，另一方面避免相对主义（后现代主义、碎片化、巴尔干化）的卡律布狄斯漩涡。最后，在反思乌玛·纳拉扬、苏珊·米勒·奥金和玛莎·努斯鲍姆的著作后，我得出结论，有办法摆脱这种伦理困境。通过关注妇女、儿童和男子的共同人类需求，有可能为公正且关怀性的全球生物伦理学奠定基础。
