Tooley Michael
Bioethics. 1998 Apr;12(2):111-24. doi: 10.1111/1467-8519.00099.
Is there a prima facie obligation to produce additional individuals whose lives would be worth living? In his paper 'Is it good to make happy people?', Stuart Rachels argues not only that there is, but, also, that precisely as much weight should be assigned to the quality of life that would be enjoyed by such potential persons, if they were to be actualized, as to the quality of life enjoyed by actually existing persons. In response, I shall argue, first, that Rachels' view is exposed to very serious objections, and secondly, that his arguments in support of his position involve a crucial assumption, which cannot be sustained, concerning the relation between, on the one hand, propositions about good-making and bad-making properties, and, on the other, propositions about right-making and wrong-making ones. I shall then argue that there is a very plausible position concerning the conditions under which an action can be morally wrong which entails the following asymmetry: there is a prima facie obligation not to bring into existence individuals whose lives are not worth living, but there is no corresponding obligation to create additional individuals whose lives would be worth living.
是否存在一种产生额外的、生活值得过的个体的初步义务？斯图尔特·雷切尔斯在其论文《让快乐的人存在是否为善？》中主张，不仅存在这样的义务，而且对于这些潜在个体（如果他们成为现实）将会享有的生活质量，应该给予与实际存在的个体所享有的生活质量完全相同的权重。作为回应，我将首先论证，雷切尔斯的观点面临非常严重的反对意见，其次，他支持其立场的论证涉及一个关键假设，即关于善性和恶性属性的命题与关于正确性和错误性属性的命题之间的关系，这个假设是无法成立的。然后我将论证，关于一个行为在何种条件下在道德上是错误的，存在一个非常合理的立场，该立场蕴含以下不对称性：存在一种初步义务，即不使生活不值得过的个体出生，但不存在相应的义务去创造额外的、生活值得过的个体。
