Rachels Stuart
Bioethics. 1998 Apr;12(2):93-110. doi: 10.1111/1467-8519.00098.
Would it be good, other things being equal, for additional people to exist whose lives would be worth living? I examine and reject several arguments for the answer that it would not be good; then I offer opposing arguments that I believe are more successful. Thus, I agree with utilitarians who say that it is better for there to be more happy people. Next I argue for the stronger claim that the happiness of potential people is as important as that of adults. Potential quality of life, then, matters in a host of bioethical issues: abortion, commercial surrogacy, the treatment of defective newborns, and so on. What is the practical upshot of all this? I reject the idea that we must do whatever is necessary to prolong life worth living. But I also reject the view that the side-effects of overpopulation always outweigh the value of realizing potential happiness. So I advocate a middle position, which I do not identify precisely. Even from this middle position, however, potential happiness is more important that is commonly assumed in bioethics.
在其他条件相同的情况下，让更多生活值得过的人存在会是好事吗？我审视并驳斥了一些认为这并非好事的观点；然后我提出了我认为更有说服力的反对观点。因此，我赞同功利主义者的观点，即有更多幸福的人存在会更好。接下来我论证一个更强的观点，即潜在人群的幸福与成年人的幸福同样重要。那么，潜在的生活质量在一系列生物伦理问题中至关重要：堕胎、商业代孕、对有缺陷新生儿的治疗等等。这一切的实际结果是什么呢？我反对那种认为我们必须不惜一切代价延长值得过的生命的观点。但我也反对那种认为人口过剩的副作用总是超过实现潜在幸福的价值的观点。所以我主张一种中间立场，我并未精确界定这一立场。然而，即使从这个中间立场来看，潜在幸福也比生物伦理学中通常所认为的更为重要。
