André F E
SmithKline Beecham Biologicals, Rixensart, Belgium.
Dev Biol (Basel). 2001;105:61-6.
Polio eradication is within our grasp and, unless something terribly wrong and unexpected happens, the three types of wild polioviruses will cease to circulate in human populations within the next few years. This achievement will be a result of the rational use of OPV. A momentous global decision--discontinuation of vaccination--will then have to be taken. The most important uncertainty that will weigh upon that decision is whether wild polioviruses can re-emerge after "eradication" defined as "complete interruption of wild polioviruses transmission", has been obtained. It is important to realise that "eradication" does not mean "extinction" in the sense that the dodo is extinct. After eradication, wild polioviruses will still lurk in laboratory specimens and in protected environmental sites (like glaciers) and may even "re-emerge" by back mutation or recombination of Sabin-derived strains that may continue to circulate even after OPV use is discontinued. Theoretically, the risk of re-emergence of wild polioviruses would be lessened if IPV was used for a number of years to immunise all those born after cessation of OPV usage. But the question is "by how much?". Vaccination with IPV will reduce the risk that persistent OPV-derived strains (e.g. in immunodeficient patients) will have the chance to establish permanent transmission after vaccination is totally discontinued. However, the risk of re-emergence will not be changed since this will be determined by the risk of accidental re-introduction. Whether the expense of switching completely from OPV to IPV globally can be justified will depend upon the relative risks of wild poliovirus re-emergence from either OPV-derived sources or other environmental sources including "escape" of virulent seed viruses from IPV production facilities. This balance of probabilities and risks will be very difficult to determine. In any case, it is likely that the decision to upscale IPV production to required levels has already been delayed too long so that polio eradication will be achieved by the use of OPV in developed as well as in less developed countries that cannot afford to use IPV at a high enough vaccine coverage rate to make it safe. Wild poLiovirus transmission has been interrupted with OPV in the Western Hemisphere. There is no reason why this cannot be done in the rest of the world. In industrialized countries that can afford it and where vaccine coverage is sufficient to prevent wild virus circulation, IPV, in combined vaccines, will be increasingly used. Let us hope that politicians in developing countries and zealous ethicists in the developed world will understand why, in the present and foreseeable future circumstances, OPV is better than IPV in the poorer countries and will not demand, in the name of equity in health, a total switch to IPV. For eradication, IPV cannot, and hopefully need not, replace OPV. At this stage it should not.
根除脊髓灰质炎已在我们的掌控之中,除非发生极为严重且意想不到的事情,否则三种野生脊髓灰质炎病毒将在未来几年内停止在人群中传播。这一成就将是合理使用口服脊髓灰质炎疫苗(OPV)的结果。届时,将不得不做出一项重大的全球决策——停止疫苗接种。在做出这一决策时,最重要的不确定因素是,在实现“根除”(定义为“野生脊髓灰质炎病毒传播完全中断”)之后,野生脊髓灰质炎病毒是否会重新出现。必须认识到,“根除”并不意味着像渡渡鸟那样灭绝。根除之后,野生脊髓灰质炎病毒仍将潜藏在实验室标本和受保护的环境场所(如冰川)中,甚至可能通过萨宾株的反向突变或重组而“重新出现”,即使在停止使用OPV之后,这些萨宾株可能仍会继续传播。从理论上讲,如果使用灭活脊髓灰质炎疫苗(IPV)数年,为所有在停止使用OPV后出生的人进行免疫接种,野生脊髓灰质炎病毒重新出现的风险将会降低。但问题是“能降低多少?”。接种IPV将降低持续存在的源自OPV的毒株(如在免疫缺陷患者体内)在完全停止疫苗接种后有机会建立永久传播的风险。然而,重新出现的风险不会改变,因为这将取决于意外重新引入的风险。在全球范围内完全从OPV转向IPV的成本是否合理,将取决于野生脊髓灰质炎病毒从源自OPV的来源或其他环境来源(包括从IPV生产设施中“逃逸”的强毒株)重新出现的相对风险。这种概率和风险的平衡将很难确定。无论如何,将IPV产量提高到所需水平的决策很可能已经拖延太久,以至于在发达国家以及无力以足够高的疫苗接种覆盖率使用IPV以确保安全的欠发达国家,都将通过使用OPV实现脊髓灰质炎的根除。在西半球,野生脊髓灰质炎病毒的传播已被OPV阻断。没有理由在世界其他地区做不到这一点。在有能力且疫苗接种覆盖率足以防止野生病毒传播的工业化国家,联合疫苗中的IPV将得到越来越多的使用。让我们希望,发展中国家的政治家和发达国家热心的伦理学家能够理解,在当前和可预见的未来情况下,为什么在较贫穷国家OPV比IPV更好,并且不会以健康公平的名义要求完全转向IPV。为了根除脊髓灰质炎,IPV无法也有望不必取代OPV。在现阶段,它不应该被取代。