Thorpe Kenneth E, Atherly Adam
Department of Health Policy and Management, Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
Health Aff (Millwood). 2001;Suppl Web Exclusives:W51-64. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.w1.51.
The rising cost of Medicare and well-documented problems plaguing Medicare+Choice (M+C) have increased interest in "reforming" the program. To improve efficiency, most reform proposals would rely on competitive bidding to establish payments to M+C plans. At the same time, beneficiaries would be given financial incentives to select low-cost M+C plans. A major unknown is the extent to which Medicare reforms would generate federal budgetary savings. To examine this issue, we develop three illustrative Medicare reform options that differ greatly in how Medicare would establish its payments to plans. Our results highlight the fact that Medicare should expect modest savings from reforming the program. However, other goals of reform, such as establishing more efficient payments to plans, would be achieved.
医疗保险费用的不断上涨以及困扰“医疗保险加选择计划”(M+C)的诸多有充分记录的问题,使得人们对该计划的“改革”兴趣日增。为提高效率,多数改革提案将依靠竞争性投标来确定向M+C计划的付款。与此同时,将给予受益人经济激励,促使他们选择低成本的M+C计划。一个主要的未知数是医疗保险改革能在多大程度上带来联邦预算节省。为研究这一问题,我们制定了三种说明性的医疗保险改革方案,这些方案在医疗保险确定向计划付款的方式上有很大差异。我们的结果凸显了这样一个事实,即医疗保险应预期通过改革该计划能实现适度节省。然而,改革的其他目标,比如建立更高效的计划付款方式,将会实现。