Koppelman Elysa R
Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48306-4401, USA.
J Med Philos. 2002 Feb;27(1):65-85. doi: 10.1076/jmep.27.1.65.2971.
Autonomous decisions are decisions that reflect the self who makes them. Since patients in need of surrogate decision making can no longer enjoy the dignity of being free to express who they are through choice and action, surrogates should strive to, at least, make sure that decisions on behalf of the patient reflects that patient's self. Concepts of the self, then, underlie views about the role autonomy should play in surrogate decision making. Alzheimer's disease (AD) complicates the situation because it is a disease which effects the self and theorists disagree about which aspect of the AD self the decision should reflect. This disagreement has led to a seemingly irresolvable split between those who favor the then self and those who favor the now self. The debate has stalled because while both of these views are attractive, neither seems adequate. That is, neither view is complete because each focuses only on one aspect of a whole self. In this paper, I argue that a good mode of surrogate decision making is one that focuses on the whole self and I offer practical advice concerning how we can begin to think about how such a decision might be made.
自主决策是反映做出这些决策的自我的决策。由于需要替代决策的患者不再能够享有通过选择和行动自由表达自我身份的尊严,因此替代决策者应至少努力确保代表患者做出的决策反映该患者的自我。自我概念因此构成了关于自主性在替代决策中应发挥何种作用的观点的基础。阿尔茨海默病(AD)使情况变得复杂,因为它是一种影响自我的疾病,并且理论家们对于决策应反映AD患者自我的哪个方面存在分歧。这种分歧导致了支持过去自我的人和支持当下自我的人之间看似无法解决的分歧。这场辩论陷入了僵局,因为虽然这两种观点都很有吸引力,但似乎都不充分。也就是说,这两种观点都不完整,因为它们各自只关注整个自我的一个方面。在本文中,我认为一种好的替代决策模式是关注整个自我的模式,并且我提供了一些实用建议,关于我们如何开始思考这样的决策可能如何做出。