Launis Veikko
Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, Finland.
Med Health Care Philos. 2002;5(2):169-79. doi: 10.1023/a:1016052122403.
The article investigates the validity of two different versions of the slippery slope argument construed in relation to human gene therapy: the empirical and the conceptual argument. The empirical version holds that our accepting somatic cell therapy will eventually cause our accepting eugenic medical goals. The conceptual version holds that we are logically committed to accepting such goals once we have accepted somatic cell therapy. It is argued that neither the empirical nor the conceptual version of the argument can provide a conclusive moral reason for banning somatic cell therapy. According to a third interpretation, referred to as the arbitrary result argument, the many apparent similarities between somatic cell therapy and eugenic-based human genetic engineering drive us to make principled choices concerning what differences and similarities between the two practices should be regarded as morally (ir)relevant. Decisions of this kind are likely to have unpredictable moral consequences. Thus formulated, the slippery slope argument has much plausibility. One objects to somatic cell therapy not so much because of what is at the bottom of the slope on which it lies, but because it is on a slope of which one does not know what is at the bottom. While the arbitrary result argument does not provide a conclusive reason for prohibiting human gene therapy, it reminds of a very important thing: when making bioethical decisions, we should be as specific and as consistent as possible about our basic moral and medical concepts.
经验性论证和概念性论证。经验性版本认为,我们接受体细胞治疗最终会导致我们接受优生医学目标。概念性版本认为,一旦我们接受了体细胞治疗,我们在逻辑上就会致力于接受此类目标。有人认为,无论是论证的经验性版本还是概念性版本,都不能为禁止体细胞治疗提供决定性的道德理由。根据第三种解释,即所谓的任意结果论证,体细胞治疗与基于优生学的人类基因工程之间许多明显的相似之处促使我们就这两种做法之间哪些差异和相似之处应被视为在道德上(不)相关做出有原则的选择。这类决定可能会产生不可预测的道德后果。如此表述的滑坡论证有很大的合理性。人们反对体细胞治疗,与其说是因为它所在滑坡的底部是什么,不如说是因为它处于一个人们不知道底部是什么的滑坡上。虽然任意结果论证没有为禁止人类基因治疗提供决定性理由,但它提醒了一件非常重要的事情:在做出生物伦理决策时,我们应该尽可能具体和一致地对待我们的基本道德和医学概念。