Arras John D
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA.
J Med Philos. 2003 Oct-Dec;28(5-6):597-613. doi: 10.1076/jmep.28.5.597.18822.
In spite of the routine acknowledgement of Richard Rorty's ubiquitous influence, those who have invoked his name en route to advancing their case for a pragmatist bioethics have not given us a very clear picture of exactly how Rorty's work might actually contribute to methodological discussion in this field. I try to provide such an account here. Given the impressive depth and scope of Rorty's work during the past two decades, I make no pretense of presenting either a comprehensive or novel interpretation of his project. My primary aim here is simply to sketch what I take to be the implications of Rorty's neopragmatism for our methodological debates within bioethics. I conclude that the yield of Rorty's pragmatism for current methodological debates in bioethics is primarily negative, knocking the props out from under any pretensions to foundations and universal principles of right and wrong. His "professorial pragmatism" and philosophical trash disposal efforts would clearly sweep away some approaches based upon appeals to nature or universal human dignity, and his deflationary nominalist view of principles would threaten the foundations of some influential principlist approaches to bioethics.
尽管人们经常承认理查德·罗蒂无处不在的影响力，但那些在推进其实用主义生物伦理学观点的过程中援引他名字的人，并没有非常清晰地向我们描绘出罗蒂的作品究竟如何能切实有助于该领域的方法论讨论。我在此尝试给出这样一种阐述。鉴于罗蒂在过去二十年里作品令人印象深刻的深度和广度，我并不假装对他的思想体系进行全面或新颖的解读。我在此的主要目的仅仅是勾勒出我认为罗蒂的新实用主义对于我们在生物伦理学方法论辩论中的意义。我的结论是，罗蒂的实用主义对于当前生物伦理学方法论辩论的成果主要是否定的，它推翻了任何关于对错的基础和普遍原则的自命不凡。他的“教授式实用主义”以及哲学上的清理工作显然会扫除一些基于诉诸自然或普遍人类尊严的方法，而他对原则的消解性唯名论观点会威胁到一些有影响力的生物伦理学原则主义方法的基础。
