Bellantoni Lisa
Division of Philosophy and Theology, Quincy University, Quincy, IL 62301, USA.
J Med Philos. 2003 Oct-Dec;28(5-6):615-33. doi: 10.1076/jmep.28.5.615.18823.
Do bioethicists need yet another theoretical approach with which to frame their disagreements? Many pragmatists contend that pragmatism, unlike its liberal and utilitarian counterparts, is uniquely commendable in (a) beginning from our lived experiences and (b) locating those experiences amid our social relations. In place of an "abstract principlism," pragmatism offers a practical "bedside-bioethic"; in lieu of "autonomy run amuk," pragmatism proposes an ethic rooted in our communal resources. To date, however, efforts to develop such a bioethic have been stymied by pragmatists' own abstract theoretical commitments, commitments that prevent them, most directly, from beginning with the lived experiences and communal resources of those who hold theological commitments. This self-imposed methodological constraint, I argue, has needlessly thwarted pragmatism's most striking methodological promise: its potential to cultivate productive debates among secular and theologically-informed participants.
生物伦理学家是否还需要另一种理论方法来阐述他们的分歧呢？许多实用主义者认为，与自由主义和功利主义不同，实用主义具有独特的可取之处：其一，它从我们的生活经历出发；其二，它将这些经历置于我们的社会关系之中。实用主义提供了一种实用的“床边生物伦理学”，以取代“抽象的原则主义”；它提出了一种植根于我们共同资源的伦理观，以替代“过度的自主性”。然而，迄今为止，发展这种生物伦理学的努力一直受到实用主义者自身抽象理论承诺的阻碍，这些承诺最直接地阻止了他们从持有神学信仰者的生活经历和共同资源出发。我认为，这种自我施加的方法论限制不必要地阻碍了实用主义最显著的方法论前景：它在世俗和有神学知识的参与者之间展开富有成效辩论的潜力。
