Black David M
Int J Psychoanal. 2004 Jun;85(Pt 3):579-95. doi: 10.1516/002075704774200753.
Two words, sympathy and empathy, are commonly used to describe three distinguishable things. These are: i) an elementary, involuntary capacity which puts us in touch with the emotional state of another; ii) the use of 'trial identification' to discover, consciously or unconsciously, the emotional state of another; iii) the affect of compassion. Because these three usages have not been clearly sorted out, and because the word sympathy has been disparaged, empathy has been overused, and a variety of technical terms (including intersubjectivity, recurrent primary identification, projective identification, alpha function etc.), all of which have important specialised applications, have been used confusingly to describe functions at a much higher level of generality. This paper attempts to sort out the three meanings with reference to the history of the two words, and also to show that the use of clear general terms gives us a more intelligible linguistic base from which other matters can be considered: in particular, whether an origin can be discerned for judgements of value other than that of superego internalisation.
“同情”和“共情”这两个词通常用于描述三种不同的情况。它们分别是：（i）一种基本的、不自觉的能力，使我们能够了解他人的情绪状态；（ii）运用“尝试性认同”，有意识或无意识地发现他人的情绪状态；（iii）同情心的情感。由于这三种用法没有得到清晰的梳理，又因为“同情”一词受到贬低，“共情”被过度使用，而且各种专业术语（包括主体间性、反复的原始认同、投射性认同、阿尔法功能等），虽然都有重要的特定应用，但在描述更具普遍性的功能时却被混淆使用。本文试图参照这两个词的历史来厘清这三种含义，同时表明使用清晰的通用术语能为我们提供一个更易懂的语言基础，以便在此基础上考虑其他问题：特别是除了超我内化之外，是否能辨别出价值判断的起源。
