Yi Richard, Rachlin Howard
State University of New York at Stony Brook, USA.
J Exp Anal Behav. 2004 Sep;82(2):161-76. doi: 10.1901/jeab.2004.82-161.
As in studies of self-control, a tit-for-tat contingency in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game creates a conflict between maximization of local and global reinforcement. The present experiments examine this conflict in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma game. Versus tit for tat, cooperation corresponds to self-control; defection, always immediately reinforced, corresponds to impulsiveness. Three experiments examined sensitivity of behavior to the global reinforcement contingency imposed by tit for tat. Undergraduates played a five-player prisoner's dilemma game against four dummy players programmed to play tit for tat or randomly. With tit for tat, a player's cooperation (or defection) increased dummy players' cooperation (or defection) on subsequent trials-reinforcing cooperation and punishing defection in the long run. Participants cooperated at a higher rate when the dummy players played tit for tat than when the dummy players played randomly. These results are consistent with findings in corresponding studies of self-control. Some participants, caught in a trap of mutual defection with the tit-for-tat playing dummy players, came to cooperate when the tit-for-tat contingency was reset ("forgiving" participants' previous defections) during a pause in the game. This increase was a result of the combined effects of a pause and reset; neither pausing nor resetting independently resulted in an increase in cooperation.
正如在自我控制研究中一样，重复囚徒困境博弈中的一报还一报策略会在局部强化最大化和全局强化最大化之间产生冲突。本实验在多人囚徒困境博弈中考察了这种冲突。与一报还一报策略相比，合作对应于自我控制；背叛，总是立即得到强化，对应于冲动。三个实验考察了行为对一报还一报策略所施加的全局强化条件的敏感性。本科生与四个被设定为采用一报还一报策略或随机策略的虚拟玩家进行五人囚徒困境博弈。采用一报还一报策略时，玩家的合作（或背叛）会增加虚拟玩家在后续试验中的合作（或背叛）——从长远来看强化合作并惩罚背叛。当虚拟玩家采用一报还一报策略时，参与者的合作率高于虚拟玩家随机策略时。这些结果与相应的自我控制研究结果一致。一些参与者在与采用一报还一报策略的虚拟玩家陷入相互背叛的陷阱后，当在游戏暂停期间一报还一报条件被重置（“原谅”参与者之前的背叛）时开始合作。这种增加是暂停和重置共同作用的结果；单独的暂停或重置都不会导致合作增加。
