Fenton Elizabeth, Lomasky Loren
Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22904, USA.
J Med Philos. 2005 Dec;30(6):579-92. doi: 10.1080/03605310500421389.
Citing grounds of conscience, pharmacists are increasingly refusing to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception, or the "morning-after pill." Whether correctly or not, these pharmacists believe that emergency contraception either constitutes the destruction of post-conception human life, or poses a significant risk of such destruction. We argue that the liberty of conscientious refusal grounds a strong moral claim, one that cannot be defeated solely by consideration of the interests of those seeking medication. We examine, and find lacking, five arguments for requiring pharmacists to fill prescriptions. However, we argue that in their professional context, pharmacists benefit from liberty restrictions on those seeking medication. What would otherwise amount to very strong claims can be defeated if they rest on some prior restriction of the liberty of others. We conclude that the issue of what policy should require pharmacists to do must be settled by way of a theory of second best. Asking "What is second best?" rather than "What is best?" offers a way to navigate the liberty restrictions that may be fixed obstacles to optimality.
以良心为由,药剂师越来越多地拒绝为紧急避孕药(即“事后避孕药”)配药。无论这种观点正确与否,这些药剂师认为紧急避孕药要么构成对受孕后人类生命的破坏,要么带来这种破坏的重大风险。我们认为,出于良心拒绝的自由构成了一项强有力的道德主张,这一主张不能仅仅通过考虑那些寻求药物治疗者的利益就被推翻。我们审视了要求药剂师配药的五个论点,并发现它们存在缺陷。然而,我们认为,在其职业背景下,药剂师受益于对那些寻求药物治疗者自由的限制。如果某些主张基于对他人自由的先前限制,那么原本非常有力的主张可能会被推翻。我们的结论是,关于政策应要求药剂师做什么的问题必须通过次优理论来解决。问“什么是次优?”而不是“什么是最优?”提供了一种应对可能成为最优性固定障碍的自由限制的方法。