Vlaev Ivo, Chater Nick
Department of Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 2006 Jan;32(1):131-49. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.32.1.131.
Existing models of strategic decision making typically assume that only the attributes of the currently played game need be considered when reaching a decision. The results presented in this article demonstrate that the so-called "co-operativeness" of the previously played prisoner's dilemma games influence choices and predictions in the current prisoner's dilemma game, which suggests that games are not considered independently. These effects involved reinforcement-based assimilation to the previous choices and also a perceptual contrast of the present game with preceding games, depending on the range and the rank of their co-operativeness. A. Parducci's (1965) range frequency theory and H. Helson's (1964) adaptation level theory are plausible theories of relative judgment of magnitude information, which could provide an account of these context effects.
现有的战略决策模型通常假定，在做出决策时，只需考虑当前所玩游戏的属性。本文所呈现的结果表明，之前玩过的囚徒困境游戏的所谓“合作性”会影响当前囚徒困境游戏中的选择和预测，这表明游戏并非被独立考虑。这些效应既包括基于强化的对先前选择的同化，也包括根据当前游戏与先前游戏合作性的范围和等级对当前游戏的感知对比。A. 帕尔杜奇（1965年）的范围频率理论和H. 赫尔森（1964年）的适应水平理论是关于量级信息相对判断的合理理论，它们可以解释这些情境效应。
