Santos F C, Pacheco J M, Lenaerts Tom
Institut de Recherches Interdisciplinaires et de Développements en Intelligence Artificielle, CP 194/6, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2006 Feb 28;103(9):3490-4. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0508201103. Epub 2006 Feb 16.
Real populations have been shown to be heterogeneous, in which some individuals have many more contacts than others. This fact contrasts with the traditional homogeneous setting used in studies of evolutionary game dynamics. We incorporate heterogeneity in the population by studying games on graphs, in which the variability in connectivity ranges from single-scale graphs, for which heterogeneity is small and associated degree distributions exhibit a Gaussian tale, to scale-free graphs, for which heterogeneity is large with degree distributions exhibiting a power-law behavior. We study the evolution of cooperation, modeled in terms of the most popular dilemmas of cooperation. We show that, for all dilemmas, increasing heterogeneity favors the emergence of cooperation, such that long-term cooperative behavior easily resists short-term noncooperative behavior. Moreover, we show how cooperation depends on the intricate ties between individuals in scale-free populations.
实际种群已被证明是异质的，其中一些个体的接触比其他个体多得多。这一事实与进化博弈动力学研究中使用的传统同质环境形成对比。我们通过研究图上的博弈来纳入种群中的异质性，其中连接性的变化范围从单尺度图（其异质性较小且相关度分布呈现高斯尾部）到无标度图（其异质性较大且度分布呈现幂律行为）。我们研究以最流行的合作困境为模型的合作演化。我们表明，对于所有困境，异质性的增加有利于合作的出现，使得长期合作行为能够轻松抵御短期非合作行为。此外，我们展示了合作如何依赖于无标度种群中个体之间的复杂联系。
