Mulder Laetitia B, van Dijk Eric, De Cremer David, Wilke Henk A M
Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2006 Oct;32(10):1312-24. doi: 10.1177/0146167206289978.
Previous social dilemma research has shown that sanctioning defection may enhance cooperation. The authors argue that this finding may have resulted from restricting participants to two behaviors (cooperation and defection). In this article, the authors introduce the concept of a "social trilemma" (a social dilemma in which an alternative option to defect is present) and tested the effect of a sanction. The authors show that a sanction only increased cooperation and collective interests in the traditional social dilemma. In a social trilemma, the sanction failed because it caused some people to choose the alternative option to defect. Moreover, the results indicate that this was especially the case when people did not expect fellow group members to cooperate. In this case, the sanction even worked counterproductive because it decreased collective interests. It is concluded that allowing individuals to consider alternative options to defect can reveal the potential detrimental effects of sanctioning systems for the collective.
以往的社会困境研究表明，制裁背叛行为可能会促进合作。作者认为，这一发现可能是由于将参与者限制在两种行为（合作和背叛）上所致。在本文中，作者引入了“社会三难困境”（一种存在背叛之外的替代选项的社会困境）的概念，并测试了制裁的效果。作者表明，制裁仅在传统社会困境中增加了合作和集体利益。在社会三难困境中，制裁失败了，因为它导致一些人选择了背叛的替代选项。此外，结果表明，当人们不期望同组的其他成员合作时，情况尤其如此。在这种情况下，制裁甚至产生了适得其反的效果，因为它降低了集体利益。得出的结论是，允许个体考虑背叛的替代选项可以揭示制裁系统对集体的潜在有害影响。
