Traulsen Arne, Nowak Martin A, Pacheco Jorge M
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
J Theor Biol. 2007 Jan 21;244(2):349-56. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.008. Epub 2006 Aug 12.
We study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in populations of finite size. Moreover, each individual has a randomly distributed number of interactions with other individuals. Therefore, the payoff of two individuals using the same strategy can be different. The resulting "payoff stochasticity" reduces the intensity of selection and therefore increases the temperature of selection. A simple mean-field approximation is derived that captures the average effect of the payoff stochasticity. Correction terms to the mean-field theory are computed and discussed.
我们研究有限规模种群中的随机进化博弈动力学。此外，每个个体与其他个体的互动次数是随机分布的。因此，采用相同策略的两个个体的收益可能不同。由此产生的“收益随机性”降低了选择强度，从而提高了选择温度。我们推导了一个简单的平均场近似，以捕捉收益随机性的平均效应。计算并讨论了平均场理论的修正项。
