Manninen B A
Arizona State University, West Campus, 4701 West Thunderbird Road, Phoenix, AZ 85069, USA.
J Med Ethics. 2006 Nov;32(11):643-51. doi: 10.1136/jme.2005.014845.
One of the most recent controversies to arise in the field of bioethics concerns the ethics for the Groningen Protocol: the guidelines proposed by the Groningen Academic Hospital in The Netherlands, which would permit doctors to actively euthanise terminally ill infants who are suffering. The Groningen Protocol has been met with an intense amount of criticism, some even calling it a relapse into a Hitleresque style of eugenics, where people with disabilities are killed solely because of their handicaps. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, the paper will attempt to disabuse readers of this erroneous understanding of the Groningen Protocol by showing how such a policy does not aim at making quality-of-life judgements, given that it restricts euthanasia to suffering and terminally ill infants. Second, the paper illustrates that what the Groningen Protocol proposes to do is both ethical and also the most humane alternative for these suffering and dying infants. Lastly, responses are given to some of the worries expressed by ethicists on the practice of any type of non-voluntary active euthanasia.
生物伦理学领域最近引发的争议之一涉及《格罗宁根议定书》的伦理问题：这是荷兰格罗宁根学术医院提出的指导方针，允许医生对患有绝症且痛苦不堪的婴儿实施积极安乐死。《格罗宁根议定书》遭到了强烈批评，有些人甚至称其是退回到类似希特勒式的优生学，即仅仅因为残疾就杀害残疾人。本文目的有三个方面。首先，本文将试图纠正读者对《格罗宁根议定书》的这种错误理解，通过说明该政策并非旨在进行生活质量判断，因为它将安乐死限制在患有绝症且痛苦不堪的婴儿身上。其次，本文说明《格罗宁根议定书》提议的做法对于这些痛苦垂死的婴儿而言既是符合伦理的，也是最人道的选择。最后，针对伦理学家对任何形式的非自愿主动安乐死做法所表达的一些担忧给出了回应。
