Pacheco Jorge M, Traulsen Arne, Nowak Martin A
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA.
Phys Rev Lett. 2006 Dec 22;97(25):258103. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.97.258103. Epub 2006 Dec 19.
We introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. We provide analytic results for the limiting cases where linking dynamics is much faster than evolutionary dynamics and vice versa, and show how the individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones maps into the problem of strategy evolution in a well-mixed population under a different game. For intermediate ranges, we investigate numerically the detailed interplay determined by these two time scales and show that the scope of validity of the analytical results extends to a much wider ratio of time scales than expected.
我们引入了一个模型，其中个体在寻求与他人建立新互动的速率上存在差异，并将其理性决策建模为一般对称双人博弈。一旦两个个体之间形成了联系，就会评估这种联系的生产率。联系可以以不同的速率中断。我们给出了两种极限情况的分析结果，一种是建立联系的动态过程比进化动态过程快得多，另一种情况相反，并且展示了形成新联系或切断不便联系的个体能力如何映射到不同博弈下充分混合群体中的策略进化问题。对于中间范围，我们通过数值方法研究了由这两个时间尺度决定的详细相互作用，并表明分析结果的有效范围扩展到了比预期宽得多的时间尺度比率。
