School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, 100876, China.
School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, 100876, China.
J Theor Biol. 2022 Oct 7;550:111225. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111225. Epub 2022 Jul 27.
Parental care is essential for biological systems. Marital bliss is one of the ideal paradigms for parental care, in which males contribute in raising offspring and females require a courtship time. Yet marital bliss state is neither Nash equilibrium nor Pareto optimum for the classic Battle of the Sexes. It thus leads to a gap between evolutionary theory and marital bliss. Previous works concentrate on the pairwise interactions between the two sexes to fill this gap, such as the courtship time and encounter rate. The social relationships within the same sex, however, receives much less attention. Here we investigate how social relationships within the same sex change marital bliss by introducing the coevolution of strategy and social network. Based on the time scale separation, it is found that a symmetric game is emergent via social adjustments within each sex, and the evolutionary outcome is determined by the interplay between the emergent symmetric game and the Battle of the Sexes. We find that marital bliss can be promoted when males are rational (strong selection limit) and females are irrational (weak selection limit); the stable Coy-Coy social relationships both stabilize and speed up marital bliss; the general criterion of stabilizing marital bliss for arbitrary imitation function are found, which are verified by simulations. Furthermore, the emergent symmetric games are insightful for determining whether the stable marital bliss is global stable. Our work provides an alternative avenue to facilitate marital bliss, which can be applied for general asymmetric games on dynamical networks.
亲代照顾对于生物系统至关重要。婚姻美满是亲代照顾的理想模式之一，在这种模式中，雄性参与抚养后代，而雌性需要求偶时间。然而，婚姻美满状态既不是纳什均衡，也不是经典性别大战的帕累托最优。因此，这导致了进化理论与婚姻美满之间的差距。以前的工作集中在两性之间的成对相互作用上，以填补这一差距，例如求偶时间和相遇率。然而，同一性别内部的社会关系却受到较少关注。在这里，我们通过引入策略和社交网络的共同进化来研究同一性别内部的社会关系如何改变婚姻美满。基于时间尺度分离，发现通过每个性别内部的社会调整会出现对称博弈，并且进化结果取决于新兴的对称博弈和性别大战之间的相互作用。我们发现，当雄性是理性的（强选择限制）而雌性是不理性的（弱选择限制）时，可以促进婚姻美满；稳定的 Coy-Coy 社会关系既稳定又加速婚姻美满；发现了任意模仿函数稳定婚姻美满的一般准则，并通过模拟进行了验证。此外，新兴的对称博弈对于确定稳定的婚姻美满是否是全局稳定的具有启发性。我们的工作为促进婚姻美满提供了一种替代途径，可以应用于动态网络上的一般非对称博弈。
