Weaver Kimberlee, Garcia Stephen M, Schwarz Norbert, Miller Dale T
R. B. Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2007 May;92(5):821-33. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.821.
Despite the importance of doing so, people do not always correctly estimate the distribution of opinions within their group. One important mechanism underlying such misjudgments is people's tendency to infer that a familiar opinion is a prevalent one, even when its familiarity derives solely from the repeated expression of 1 group member. Six experiments demonstrate this effect and show that it holds even when perceivers are consciously aware that the opinions come from 1 speaker. The results also indicate that the effect is due to opinion accessibility rather than a conscious inference about the meaning of opinion repetition in a group. Implications for social consensus estimation and social influence are discussed.
尽管这样做很重要，但人们并不总是能正确估计自己群体内部的意见分布。这种错误判断背后的一个重要机制是，人们倾向于推断一个熟悉的意见就是普遍的意见，即使这种熟悉仅仅源于一个群体成员的反复表达。六个实验证明了这种效应，并表明即使感知者有意识地知道这些意见来自一个发言者，这种效应仍然存在。结果还表明，这种效应是由于意见的易获取性，而不是对群体中意见重复意义的有意识推断。文中讨论了对社会共识估计和社会影响的启示。
