Praetorius Nini
Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Conscious Cogn. 2009 Mar;18(1):325-38. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.005. Epub 2008 Apr 14.
The paper argues that Zahavi's defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. "identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena", and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object "feels" like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-reflective minimal core self and the explanation of the unity and identity of the self through time give rise to intractable problems.
该论文认为，扎哈维对自我作为一种体验维度（即“与体验现象的第一人称给予性相认同”）以及对前反思性最小核心自我概念的辩护依赖于一个毫无根据的假设。人们假定，对对象体验的现象模式的觉知，即对象对于体验者而言“感觉”如何，与体验的第一人称给予性相当，甚至蕴含着体验的第一人称给予性。因此，关于前反思性最小核心自我的基础作用的论证以及对自我在时间中的统一性和同一性的解释都引发了棘手的问题。
