Pilpel Avital
Philosophy Department, University of Haifa, 1901 Eshkol Tower, Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel.
Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci. 2007 Sep;38(3):618-26. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.06.009. Epub 2007 Sep 4.
This paper is concerned with the role of rational belief change theory in the philosophical understanding of experimental error. Today, philosophers seek insight about error in the investigation of specific experiments, rather than in general theories. Nevertheless, rational belief change theory adds to our understanding of just such cases: R. A. Fisher's criticism of Mendel's experiments being a case in point. After an historical introduction, the main part of this paper investigates Fisher's paper from the point of view of rational belief change theory: what changes of belief about Mendel's experiment does Fisher go through and with what justification. It leads to surprising insights about what Fisher had done right and wrong, and, more generally, about the limits of statistical methods in detecting error.
本文关注合理信念变化理论在对实验误差的哲学理解中的作用。如今，哲学家们寻求在对特定实验的研究中洞察误差，而非在一般理论中。尽管如此，合理信念变化理论增进了我们对这类情况的理解：罗纳德·艾尔默·费希尔对孟德尔实验的批评就是一个恰当的例子。在进行历史介绍之后，本文的主要部分从合理信念变化理论的角度研究费希尔的论文：费希尔对孟德尔实验的信念发生了哪些变化，以及这些变化的依据是什么。这引发了关于费希尔的对错之处的惊人见解，更广泛地说，引发了关于统计方法在检测误差方面的局限性的见解。
