Hampton James A, Estes Zachary, Simmons Sabrina
Department of Psychology, City University, London, England.
Mem Cognit. 2007 Oct;35(7):1785-800. doi: 10.3758/bf03193510.
The transformation paradigm (Rips, 1989) was used to contrast causal homeostasis and strict essentialist beliefs about biological kinds. Participants read scenarios describing animals that changed their appearance and behavior through either accidental mutation or developmental maturation and then rated the animals on the basis of similarity, typicality, and category membership both before and after the change. Experiment 1 in the present study replicated the dissociation of typicality and categorization reported by Rips (1989) but also revealed systematic individual differences in categorization. With typicality and membership ratings collected between participants, however, Experiment 2 found no evidence for the dissociation and few essentialist responders. In Experiment 3, excluding information about offspring led most participants to categorize on the basis of appearance and behavior alone. However, with offspring information included and with questioning focused on the change of kind, essentialist categorization was still surprisingly rare. We conclude that strict essentialist categorization in the transformation task is relatively rare and highly task dependent, and that categorization is more commonly based on causal homeostasis.
转换范式(里普斯,1989年)被用于对比关于生物种类的因果稳态和严格本质主义信念。参与者阅读描述动物通过偶然突变或发育成熟改变其外观和行为的情景,然后在变化前后根据相似性、典型性和类别归属对动物进行评分。本研究的实验1重复了里普斯(1989年)报告的典型性和分类的分离,但也揭示了分类中的系统性个体差异。然而,在参与者之间收集典型性和归属评分后,实验2没有发现分离的证据,且本质主义回应者很少。在实验3中,排除有关后代的信息导致大多数参与者仅根据外观和行为进行分类。然而,当包含后代信息且问题聚焦于种类变化时,本质主义分类仍然出奇地罕见。我们得出结论,在转换任务中严格的本质主义分类相对罕见且高度依赖任务,并且分类更常见地基于因果稳态。