Brown Garrett D, Barab Jordan
828 Richmond St., El Cerrito, CA 94530-2925, USA.
New Solut. 2007;17(4):311-24. doi: 10.2190/NS.17.4.g.
Practitioners of Behavior-Based Safety (BBS) claim dramatic reductions in worker injuries and illnesses through modifying workers' "unsafe behaviors." This case study of a BBS program implemented by KFM, a giant construction consortium rebuilding the eastern span of the San Francisco Bay Bridge in California, documents how BBS was used to suppress reporting of worker injuries and illnesses on site. The key elements of KFM's BBS "injury prevention" strategy included: 1) cash incentives to workers and supervisors who do not report injuries; 2) reprisals and threats of reprisals against those employees who do report injuries; 3) selection and use of employer friendly occupational health clinics and workers compensation insurance administrators; 4) strict limits on the activities of contract industrial hygiene consultants; and 5) a secretive management committee that decides whether reported injuries and illnesses are legitimate and recordable. KFM reported injury and illness rates 55% to 72% lower than other bridge builders in the Bay Area, but the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) issued Willful citations to the consortium in June 2006 for failing to record 13 worker injuries on its "OSHA Log 300," as required by law.
基于行为的安全(BBS)从业者声称,通过改变工人的“不安全行为”,可大幅减少工人受伤和患病情况。本案例研究聚焦于KFM(一家在加利福尼亚州重建旧金山湾大桥东跨段的大型建筑集团)实施的BBS项目,记录了BBS如何被用于压制现场工人受伤和患病情况的报告。KFM的BBS“预防伤害”策略的关键要素包括:1)对未报告受伤情况的工人和主管给予现金奖励;2)对报告受伤情况的员工进行报复和威胁报复;3)选择并使用对雇主友好的职业健康诊所和工伤赔偿保险管理人员;4)严格限制合同工业卫生顾问的活动;5)一个秘密的管理委员会,负责决定所报告的受伤和患病情况是否合理且应记录在案。KFM报告的受伤和患病比率比湾区其他桥梁建设者低55%至72%,但加利福尼亚职业安全与健康司(Cal/OSHA)于2006年6月对该集团发出故意违规传票,因其未按法律要求在“OSHA日志300”中记录13起工人受伤情况。