Amaratunga Carol A, O'Sullivan Tracey L, Phillips Karen P, Lemyre Louise, O'Connor Eileen, Dow Darcie, Corneil Wayne
Faculty of Medicine, Department of Epidemiology and Community Medicine, Women's Health Research Unit, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
Am J Disaster Med. 2007 Jul-Aug;2(4):195-210.
In response to the 2003 global outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and the threat of pandemic influenza, Canadian hospitals have been actively developing and revising their emergency plans. Healthcare workers are a particularly vulnerable group at risk of occupational exposure during infectious disease outbreaks, as seen during SARS and as documented/reported in the recent National Survey of the Work and Health of Nurses (Statistics Canada, 2006). Approximately one third of Canadian nurses identified job strain and poor health, related to their work environment. Three years after SARS, this article presents a critical analysis of the gaps of three hospital pandemic influenza plans in the context of established organizational supports for healthcare workers.
Hospital pandemic influenza plans were obtained from institutional representatives in three Ontario cities. Qualitative gap analysis of these plans was conducted using a checklist of 11 support categories, developed from a review of existing literature and findings from a previous study of focus groups with emergency and critical care nurses.
Support mechanisms were identified in the plans; however, gaps were evident in preparation for personal protective equipment, education and informational support, and support during quarantine. Hospital emergency planning could be more robust by including additional organizational supports such as emotional/psychological support services, delineating management responsibilities, human resources, vaccine/anti-viral planning, recognition/compensation, media strategies, and professional development.
Since the 2003 SARS outbreak, hospitals have invested in pandemic planning, as evidenced by the comprehensive plans examined here. Organizational support mechanisms for healthcare workers were included in these hospital plans; however, the gaps identified here may have serious implications for employee health and safety, and overall response during a large scale infectious disease outbreak. The authors provide a number of recommendations for consideration in infectious disease pandemic plan development to better support the healthcare workers in their roles as first responders.
为应对2003年全球严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)疫情以及大流行性流感的威胁,加拿大医院一直在积极制定和修订其应急计划。医护人员是传染病暴发期间面临职业暴露风险的特别脆弱群体,如SARS期间所见,以及最近《护士工作与健康全国调查》(加拿大统计局,2006年)所记录/报告的那样。约三分之一的加拿大护士表示工作压力大且健康状况不佳,这与他们的工作环境有关。SARS爆发三年后,本文在已确立的医护人员组织支持背景下,对三家医院的大流行性流感计划的差距进行了批判性分析。
从安大略省三个城市的机构代表处获取医院大流行性流感计划。使用一份由11个支持类别组成的清单,对这些计划进行定性差距分析,该清单是根据对现有文献的综述以及先前对急诊和重症护理护士焦点小组研究的结果制定的。
计划中确定了支持机制;然而,在个人防护设备准备、教育和信息支持以及隔离期间的支持方面存在明显差距。通过纳入额外的组织支持,如情感/心理支持服务、明确管理职责、人力资源、疫苗/抗病毒规划、认可/补偿、媒体策略和专业发展,医院应急规划可以更加完善。
自2003年SARS疫情爆发以来,医院已在大流行规划方面投入资源,此处审查的全面计划即为证明。这些医院计划中包括了医护人员的组织支持机制;然而,此处发现的差距可能对员工健康和安全以及大规模传染病暴发期间的整体应对产生严重影响。作者提供了一些建议,供在制定传染病大流行计划时考虑,以更好地支持医护人员作为第一响应者的角色。