Klein Stanley B, Robertson Theresa E, Gangi Cynthia E, Loftus Judith
University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA.
Memory. 2008;16(5):556-65. doi: 10.1080/09658210802010489.
In a recent paper, Sakaki (2007) proposed that Klein and Loftus's conclusion that semantic and episodic trait self-knowledge are functionally independent (e.g., Klein, Babey, & Sherman, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992b) was based on questionable assumptions and not supported by the available evidence. In this paper we show that Sakaki (2007) has misinterpreted our position on the independence of self-knowledge, omitted mention of large portions of the relevant research at odds with her contention, and conducted her studies with procedures we explicitly warned against due to interpretive ambiguities associated with their use.
在最近一篇论文中,坂木(2007年)提出,克莱因和洛夫特斯关于语义和情景特质自我认知在功能上相互独立的结论(例如,克莱因、巴比和谢尔曼,1997年;克莱因和洛夫特斯,1993年a;克莱因、洛夫特斯、特拉夫顿和富尔曼,1992年b)是基于可疑的假设,且没有得到现有证据的支持。在本文中,我们表明坂木(2007年)误解了我们关于自我认知独立性的立场,遗漏了与她的论点相悖的大部分相关研究,并且在研究过程中采用了我们因使用时存在解释模糊性而明确警告过不要使用的程序。