Hardt John J
Neiswanger Institute for Bioethics and Health Policy, Loyola University Chicago Stritch School of Medicine, 2160 S. First Ave, Building 120, Suite 280, Maywood, IL, 60153, USA.
Theor Med Bioeth. 2008;29(3):151-60. doi: 10.1007/s11017-008-9073-1.
This article critically evaluates the conception of conscience underlying the debate about the proper place and role of conscience in the clinical encounter. It suggests that recovering a conception of conscience rooted in the Catholic moral tradition could offer resources for moving the debate past an unproductive assertion of conflicting rights, namely, physicians' rights to conscience versus patients' rights to socially and legally sanctioned medical interventions. It proposes that conscience is a necessary component of the moral life in general and a necessary resource for maintaining a coherent sense of moral agency. It demonstrates that an earlier and intellectually richer conception of conscience, in contrast with common contemporary formulations, makes the judgments of conscience accountable to reason, open to critique, and protected from becoming a bastion for bigotry, idiosyncrasy, and personal bias.
本文批判性地评估了关于良心在临床诊疗中恰当位置和作用的辩论背后的良心概念。文章指出,重拾根植于天主教道德传统的良心概念,可为推动这场辩论提供资源,使其超越对相互冲突权利的无效主张,即医生的良心权利与患者获得社会和法律认可的医疗干预的权利之间的冲突。文章提出,良心总体上是道德生活的必要组成部分,也是维持连贯道德行为意识的必要资源。文章表明,与当代常见表述相比,一个更早且在思想上更丰富的良心概念使良心判断对理性负责、接受批评,并防止其成为偏执、特质和个人偏见的堡垒。