Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Route One and College Road East, Princeton, NJ, 08543, USA.
J Health Econ. 2009 Jul;28(4):902-7. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.03.004. Epub 2009 Mar 28.
The empirical literature that explores whether physicians respond to financial incentives has not definitively answered the question of whether physicians alter their treatment behavior at the margin. Previous research has not been able to distinguish that part of a physician response that uniformly alters treatment of all patients under a physician's care from that which affects some, but not all of a physician's patients. To explore physicians' marginal responses to financial incentives while accounting for the selection of physicians into different financial arrangements where others could not, I use data from a survey of physician visits to isolate the effect that capitation, a form of reimbursement wherein physicians receive zero marginal revenue for a range of physician provided services, has on the care provided by a physician. Fixed effects regression results reveal that physicians spend less time with their capitated patients than with their non-capitated patients.
探索医生是否会对经济激励做出反应的实证文献并没有明确回答医生是否会改变他们的边缘治疗行为的问题。以前的研究无法区分医生反应的一部分，这部分统一改变了医生照顾的所有患者的治疗方法，以及影响部分但不是所有医生患者的治疗方法。为了在考虑到医生选择不同财务安排的情况下，探索医生对经济激励的边际反应，而其他医生则无法选择，我使用了对医生就诊的调查数据，以隔离按人头付费（一种报销方式，其中医生对一系列医生提供的服务没有零边际收入）对医生提供的护理的影响。固定效应回归结果显示，与非人头付费患者相比，医生花在人头付费患者身上的时间更少。
