Department of Emergency Medicine, Drexel University College of Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102, USA.
Prehosp Disaster Med. 2009 May-Jun;24(3):231-8. doi: 10.1017/s1049023x00006865.
The smallpox vaccination emergency preparedness program has been unsuccessful in enrolling sufficient numbers of healthcare workers.
The objective of this study was to use game theory to analyze a pre-event vaccination versus post-event vaccination program using the example of a terrorist considering an attack with smallpox or a hoax.
A three-person game (normal and extensive form), and an in-person game are played for pre-event and post-event vaccinations of healthcare workers facing the possibility of a smallpox attack or hoax.
Full pre-event vaccinations of all targeted healthcare workers are not necessary to deter a terrorist attack. In addition, coordinating vaccinations among healthcare workers, individual healthcare worker risk aversion, and the degree to which terrorists make the last move based on specific information on the status of pre-event vaccination all greatly impact strategy selection for both sides. A Nash Equilibrium of pre- and post-event vaccination strategies among a large number of healthcare professionals will tend to eliminate the advantage (of the terrorists) of a smallpox attack over a hoax, but may not eliminate some probability of a smallpox attack.
Emergency preparedness would benefit from game theory analysis of the costs and payoffs of specific terrorism/counter-terrorism strategies.
天花疫苗应急准备计划未能招募到足够数量的医护人员。
本研究旨在通过考虑使用天花或恶作剧进行恐怖袭击的恐怖分子的例子，使用博弈论分析针对医护人员的事前疫苗接种和事后疫苗接种计划。
针对面临天花袭击或恶作剧可能性的医护人员，进行三人游戏（正常和扩展形式）和面对面游戏，以进行事前和事后疫苗接种。
完全事先为所有目标医护人员接种疫苗并非防止恐怖袭击所必需。此外，协调医护人员之间的疫苗接种、个别医护人员的风险规避，以及恐怖分子根据事前疫苗接种情况的具体信息做出最后决策的程度，都极大地影响了双方的策略选择。大量医护人员的事前和事后疫苗接种策略的纳什均衡倾向于消除天花袭击相对于恶作剧的优势，但可能不会消除天花袭击的某些可能性。
针对特定的恐怖主义/反恐策略的成本和收益进行博弈论分析，将使应急准备受益。
