LeDuc James W, Anderson Kevin, Bloom Marshall E, Carrion Ricardo, Feldmann Heinz, Fitch J Patrick, Geisbert Joan B, Geisbert Thomas W, Holbrook Michael R, Jahrling Peter B, Ksiazek Thomas G
Institute for Human Infections and Immunity, Galveston National Laboratory, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas 77555-0610, USA.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2009 Jul;15(7):e1. doi: 10.3201/eid1507.081523.
Directors of all major BioSafety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories in the United States met in 2008 to review the current status of biocontainment laboratory operations and to discuss the potential impact of a proposed 2-person security rule on maximum-containment laboratory operations. Special attention was paid to the value and risks that would result from a requirement that 2 persons be physically present in the laboratory at all times. A consensus emerged indicating that a video monitoring system represents a more efficient, economical standard; provides greater assurance that pathogens are properly manipulated; and offers an increased margin of employee safety and institutional security. The 2-person security rule (1 to work and 1 to observe) may decrease compliance with dual responsibilities of safety and security by placing undue pressure on the person being observed to quickly finish the work, and by placing the observer in the containment environment unnecessarily.
2008年,美国所有主要的生物安全4级(BSL-4)实验室的负责人齐聚一堂,审查生物防护实验室操作的现状,并讨论一项拟议的两人安全规则对最高防护实验室操作的潜在影响。特别关注了要求实验室必须始终有两人在场这一规定所带来的价值和风险。与会者达成了共识,即视频监控系统是一种更高效、经济的标准;能更有力地确保病原体得到妥善处理;并能提高员工安全和机构安保系数。两人安全规则(一人操作,一人监督)可能会因给被监督者施加尽快完成工作的不当压力,以及不必要地让监督者置身于防护环境中,而降低对安全与安保双重责任的遵守程度。