School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK.
Br J Dev Psychol. 2009 Sep;27(Pt 3):513-43. doi: 10.1348/026151008x334737.
We review evidence relating to children's ability to acknowledge false beliefs within a simulation account according to which our focus is set by default to the world as we know it: hence, our current beliefs assume salience over beliefs that do not fall into this category. The model proposes that the ease with which we imaginatively shift from this default depends on the salience of our current belief, relative to the salience of the belief that is being simulated. However, children do use a rule-based approach for mentalizing in some contexts, which has the advantage of protecting them from the salience of their own belief. Rule-based mentalizing judgements might be faster, cognitively easier and less prone to error, relative to simulation-based judgements that are much influenced by salience. We propose that although simulation is primary, rule-based approaches develop as a shortcut; we thus grow from individuals capable of using only simulation into individuals capable of both techniques.
我们回顾了与儿童根据模拟理论承认虚假信念的能力相关的证据。根据这一理论,我们的注意力默认集中在我们所知道的世界上:因此,我们当前的信念相对于不属于这一范畴的信念更突出。该模型提出,我们从这种默认状态中进行富有想象力的转变的难易程度取决于我们当前信念的突出程度,相对于正在模拟的信念的突出程度。然而,儿童在某些情况下确实会使用基于规则的心理理论方法,这种方法的优点是可以防止他们自己的信念突出。相对于受突出影响较大的基于模拟的判断,基于规则的心理理论判断可能更快、认知上更容易且出错更少。我们提出,尽管模拟是主要的,但基于规则的方法是一种捷径;因此,我们从只能使用模拟的个体成长为能够同时使用这两种技术的个体。