Althouse Benjamin M, Bergstrom Theodore C, Bergstrom Carl T
Department of Biology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195-1800, USA.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2010 Jan 26;107 Suppl 1(Suppl 1):1696-701. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0906078107. Epub 2009 Dec 14.
Control measures used to limit the spread of infectious disease often generate externalities. Vaccination for transmissible diseases can reduce the incidence of disease even among the unvaccinated, whereas antimicrobial chemotherapy can lead to the evolution of antimicrobial resistance and thereby limit its own effectiveness over time. We integrate the economic theory of public choice with mathematical models of infectious disease to provide a quantitative framework for making allocation decisions in the presence of these externalities. To illustrate, we present a series of examples: vaccination for tetanus, vaccination for measles, antibiotic treatment of otitis media, and antiviral treatment of pandemic influenza.
用于限制传染病传播的控制措施往往会产生外部效应。针对可传播疾病的疫苗接种即使在未接种疫苗的人群中也能降低疾病发病率,而抗菌化疗可能导致抗菌药物耐药性的演变,从而随着时间的推移限制其自身的有效性。我们将公共选择的经济理论与传染病数学模型相结合,以提供一个在存在这些外部效应的情况下做出资源分配决策的定量框架。为了说明这一点,我们给出一系列例子:破伤风疫苗接种、麻疹疫苗接种、中耳炎的抗生素治疗以及大流行性流感的抗病毒治疗。