Adida Elodie, Dey Debabrata, Mamani Hamed
School of Business Administration, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, USA.
Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195-3226, USA.
Eur J Oper Res. 2013 Dec 1;231(2):414-427. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.05.034. Epub 2013 May 31.
One of the most important concerns for managing public health is the prevention of infectious diseases. Although vaccines provide the most effective means for preventing infectious diseases, there are two main reasons why it is often difficult to reach a socially optimal level of vaccine coverage: (i) the emergence of operational issues (such as yield uncertainty) on the supply side, and (ii) the existence of negative network effects on the consumption side. In particular, uncertainties about production yield and vaccine imperfections often make manufacturing some vaccines a risky process and may lead the manufacturer to produce below the socially optimal level. At the same time, negative network effects provide incentives to potential consumers to free ride off the immunity of the vaccinated population. In this research, we consider how a central policy-maker can induce a socially optimal vaccine coverage through the use of incentives to both consumers and the vaccine manufacturer. We consider a monopoly market for an imperfect vaccine; we show that a fixed two-part subsidy is unable to coordinate the market, but derive a two-part of subsidies that leads to a socially efficient level of coverage.
公共卫生管理中最重要的问题之一是传染病的预防。尽管疫苗是预防传染病最有效的手段，但通常难以达到社会最优疫苗接种覆盖率水平主要有两个原因：（i）供应方出现运营问题（如产量不确定性），以及（ii）消费方存在负面网络效应。特别是，产量的不确定性和疫苗的不完善常常使某些疫苗的生产成为一个有风险的过程，并可能导致制造商的产量低于社会最优水平。与此同时，负面网络效应促使潜在消费者搭接种疫苗人群免疫的便车。在本研究中，我们考虑中央政策制定者如何通过对消费者和疫苗制造商都使用激励措施来诱导达到社会最优疫苗接种覆盖率。我们考虑一个不完美疫苗的垄断市场；我们表明固定的两部制补贴无法协调市场，但推导出一种两部制补贴，可导致达到社会有效覆盖率水平。
