Department of Psychology, American University, Washington, DC 20016, USA.
Anim Cogn. 2010 Jul;13(4):671-7. doi: 10.1007/s10071-010-0310-4. Epub 2010 Feb 4.
In the human mini-ultimatum game, a proposer splits a sum of money with a responder. If the responder accepts, both are paid. If not, neither is paid. Typically, responders reject inequitable distributions, favoring punishing over maximizing. In Jensen et al.'s (Science 318:107-109, 2007) adaptation with apes, a proposer selects between two distributions of raisins. Despite inequitable offers, responders often accept, thereby maximizing. The rejection response differs between the human and ape versions of this game. For humans, rejection is instantaneous; for apes, it requires 1 min of inaction. We replicate Jensen et al.'s procedure in humans with money. When waiting 1 min to reject, humans favor punishing over maximizing; however, when rejection requires 5 min of inaction, humans, like apes, maximize. If species differences in time horizons are accommodated, Jensen et al.'s ape data are reproducible in humans.
在人类小额最后通牒博弈中,提议者将一笔钱与响应者分配。如果响应者接受,双方都将获得报酬。如果不接受,则双方都没有报酬。通常情况下,响应者会拒绝不公平的分配,更倾向于惩罚而不是最大化收益。在 Jensen 等人的研究(Science 318:107-109, 2007)中,使用猩猩进行了改编,提议者在两种葡萄干分配方案之间进行选择。尽管存在不公平的提议,响应者通常会接受,从而实现最大化收益。在人类和猩猩版本的这个游戏中,拒绝的反应是不同的。对于人类来说,拒绝是即时的;对于猩猩来说,需要 1 分钟的无动作时间。我们用金钱在人类中复制了 Jensen 等人的程序。当等待 1 分钟拒绝时,人类更倾向于惩罚而不是最大化收益;然而,当拒绝需要 5 分钟的无动作时间时,人类就像猩猩一样,会选择最大化收益。如果考虑到物种在时间跨度上的差异,那么 Jensen 等人的猩猩数据在人类中是可以重现的。