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准备社区医院管理生物安全 3 级和 4 级实验室中与工作相关的传染性病原体暴露。

Preparing a community hospital to manage work-related exposures to infectious agents in BioSafety level 3 and 4 laboratories.

机构信息

Infectious Disease Specialists, PC, Missoula, Montana, USA.

出版信息

Emerg Infect Dis. 2010 Mar;16(3):373-8. doi: 10.3201/eid1603.091485.

DOI:10.3201/eid1603.091485
PMID:20202409
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3322039/
Abstract

Construction of new BioSafety Level (BSL) 3 and 4 laboratories has raised concerns regarding provision of care to exposed workers because of healthcare worker (HCW) unfamiliarity with precautions required. When the National Institutes of Health began construction of a new BSL-4 laboratory in Hamilton, Montana, USA, in 2005, they contracted with St. Patrick Hospital in Missoula, Montana, for care of those exposed. A care and isolation unit is described. We developed a training program for HCWs that emphasized the optimal use of barrier precautions and used pathogen-specific modules and simulations with mannequins and fluorescent liquids that represented infectious body fluids. The facility and training led to increased willingness among HCWs to care for patients with all types of communicable diseases. This model may be useful for other hospitals, whether they support a BSL-4 facility, are in the proximity of a BSL-3 facility, or are interested in upgrading their facilities to prepare for exotic and novel infectious diseases.

摘要

新建生物安全等级 3 级和 4 级实验室引起了人们对暴露工人护理的关注,因为医护人员不熟悉所需的预防措施。当美国国立卫生研究院于 2005 年开始在美国蒙大拿州汉密尔顿建造一个新的 BSL-4 实验室时,他们与蒙大拿州密苏拉的圣帕特里克医院签订了合同,为暴露者提供护理。本文介绍了一个护理和隔离单元。我们为医护人员开发了一个培训计划,强调了最佳使用屏障预防措施,并使用针对特定病原体的模块和模拟人体模型和荧光液体进行了模拟,这些液体代表了传染性体液。该设施和培训提高了医护人员照顾各种传染病患者的意愿。无论医院是否支持 BSL-4 设施,是否靠近 BSL-3 设施,或者是否有兴趣升级设施以应对外来和新型传染病,这种模式都可能对其他医院有用。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8f62/3322039/b8ee7334f54c/09-1485-F.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8f62/3322039/b8ee7334f54c/09-1485-F.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8f62/3322039/b8ee7334f54c/09-1485-F.jpg

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