Department of Public Health, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
Lancet. 2010 Mar 27;375(9720):1120-30. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(10)60063-3.
Inappropriate incentives as part of China's fee-for-service payment system have resulted in rapid cost increase, inefficiencies, poor quality, unaffordable health care, and an erosion of medical ethics. To reverse these outcomes, a strategy of experimentation to realign incentives for providers with the social goals of improvement in quality and efficiency has been initiated in China. This Review shows how lessons that have been learned from international experiences have been improved further in China by realignment of the incentives for providers towards prevention and primary care, and incorporation of a treatment protocol for hospital services. Although many experiments are new, preliminary evidence suggests a potential to produce savings in costs. However, because these experiments have not been scientifically assessed in China, evidence of their effects on quality and health outcome is largely missing. Although a reform of the provider's payment can be an effective short-term strategy, professional ethics need to be re-established and incentives changed to alter the profit motives of Chinese hospitals and physicians alike. When hospitals are given incentives to achieve maximum profit, incentives for hospitals and physicians must be separated.
在中国按服务项目付费的支付体系中,不当的激励机制导致了成本的快速增长、效率低下、质量差、医疗费用不可负担以及医疗道德的沦丧。为了扭转这些结果,中国启动了一项策略性试验,旨在重新调整提供者的激励机制,使其与提高质量和效率的社会目标保持一致。本综述展示了中国如何通过调整提供者的激励机制以促进预防和初级保健,并纳入医院服务的治疗方案,进一步改进了从国际经验中吸取的经验教训。尽管许多试验都是新的,但初步证据表明,这些试验有可能在成本上节省开支。然而,由于这些试验在中国尚未经过科学评估,因此其对质量和健康结果的影响的证据在很大程度上是缺失的。虽然对提供者的支付进行改革可能是一种有效的短期策略,但需要重新建立职业道德,并改变激励机制,以改变中国医院和医生的盈利动机。当医院被激励去实现最大利润时,就必须将医院和医生的激励分开。