Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, A-1090 Vienna, Austria.
Proc Biol Sci. 2010 Aug 22;277(1693):2427-33. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2010.0065. Epub 2010 Apr 7.
Cooperation in public good games is greatly promoted by positive and negative incentives. In this paper, we use evolutionary game dynamics to study the evolution of opportunism (the readiness to be swayed by incentives) and the evolution of trust (the propensity to cooperate in the absence of information on the co-players). If both positive and negative incentives are available, evolution leads to a population where defectors are punished and players cooperate, except when they can get away with defection. Rewarding behaviour does not become fixed, but can play an essential role in catalysing the emergence of cooperation, especially if the information level is low.
正、负激励极大地促进了公共利益博弈中的合作。本文运用演化博弈动力学研究了机会主义(受激励影响的倾向)和信任(在没有关于合作方信息的情况下合作的倾向)的演变。如果正、负激励都存在,演化会导致一个惩罚背叛者、促使玩家合作的群体,除非他们能够逃避背叛。奖励行为不会固定不变,但可以在促进合作的出现方面发挥重要作用,特别是在信息水平较低的情况下。