Center for Evolutionary Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2010 May 11;107 Suppl 2(Suppl 2):9007-14. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0914623107. Epub 2010 May 5.
Blank-slate theories of human intelligence propose that reasoning is carried out by general-purpose operations applied uniformly across contents. An evolutionary approach implies a radically different model of human intelligence. The task demands of different adaptive problems select for functionally specialized problem-solving strategies, unleashing massive increases in problem-solving power for ancestrally recurrent adaptive problems. Because exchange can evolve only if cooperators can detect cheaters, we hypothesized that the human mind would be equipped with a neurocognitive system specialized for reasoning about social exchange. Whereas humans perform poorly when asked to detect violations of most conditional rules, we predicted and found a dramatic spike in performance when the rule specifies an exchange and violations correspond to cheating. According to critics, people's uncanny accuracy at detecting violations of social exchange rules does not reflect a cheater detection mechanism, but extends instead to all rules regulating when actions are permitted (deontic conditionals). Here we report experimental tests that falsify these theories by demonstrating that deontic rules as a class do not elicit the search for violations. We show that the cheater detection system functions with pinpoint accuracy, searching for violations of social exchange rules only when these are likely to reveal the presence of someone who intends to cheat. It does not search for violations of social exchange rules when these are accidental, when they do not benefit the violator, or when the situation would make cheating difficult.
空白石板理论认为,推理是通过普遍适用于各种内容的通用操作来进行的。而进化方法则暗示了一种截然不同的人类智能模型。不同适应问题的任务要求选择功能专门化的问题解决策略,从而为祖先反复出现的适应问题释放出巨大的问题解决能力。由于只有当合作者能够发现骗子时,交换才能进化,我们假设人类的思维会配备一个专门用于推理社会交换的神经认知系统。虽然当被要求检测大多数条件规则的违反时,人类表现不佳,但我们预测并发现,当规则指定交换且违反对应于欺骗时,表现会大幅提高。批评者认为,人们在检测社会交换规则违反方面的惊人准确性并不反映骗子检测机制,而是扩展到所有规定何时允许采取行动的规则(道义条件句)。在这里,我们报告了实验测试,通过证明道义规则作为一个类别不会引发对违反的搜索,从而否定了这些理论。我们表明,骗子检测系统具有极高的准确性,只有在社交交换规则的违反可能揭示有人意图欺骗时,才会搜索这些违反。当违反是偶然的、对违反者没有好处的,或者情况使欺骗变得困难时,它不会搜索社交交换规则的违反。