Hoffman Allison K
Harvard Law School, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics, USA.
Am J Law Med. 2010;36(1):7-77. doi: 10.1177/009885881003600101.
The 2010 federal health insurance reform act includes an individual mandate that will require Americans to carry health insurance. This article argues that even if the mandate were to catalyze universal health insurance coverage, it will fall short on some of the policy objectives many hope to achieve through a mandate if implemented in a fragmented insurance market. To uncover this problem, this article sets forth a novel framework that disentangles three different policy objectives the individual mandate can serve. Namely, supporters of the mandate might hope for it to: (1) facilitate greater health and financial security for the uninsured ("paternalism"); (2) eliminate inefficiencies in health care delivery and financing ("efficiency"); and/or (3) require the healthy to buy insurance to help fund medical care for the sick ("health redistribution"). Health redistribution--the primary focus of this article--is a shifting of wealth from the healthy to the sick through the mechanism of risk pooling. Many see health redistribution as a means to enable all Americans to more equitably access medical care on the basis of need, rather than on the basis of ability or willingness to pay. Drawing on evidence from the implementation of an individual mandate in Massachusetts's health reform in 2006, this article reveals that the fragmented American health insurance market will thwart the mandate's ability to achieve these objectives- in particular the goal of health redistribution. Fragmentation is an atomization of the insurance market into numerous risk pools that has been driven by market competition and regulation. It prevents Americans from sharing broadly in the risk of poor health and, in doing so, entrenches a system where access to medical care remains tied to ability to pay and individualized characteristics. The final section of this article examines how various policies, including some in the new law (e.g., insurance regulation and exchanges) and others not (e.g., expanded public insurance), can reduce fragmentation so that the mandate can successfully serve all desired objectives and in the process gain greater legitimacy over time.
2010年联邦医疗保险改革法案包含一项个人强制参保规定,该规定将要求美国人购买医疗保险。本文认为,即使这项强制参保规定能够促成全民医疗保险覆盖,但如果在分散的保险市场中实施,它将无法实现许多人希望通过强制参保规定达成的一些政策目标。为揭示这一问题,本文提出了一个新颖的框架,该框架梳理了个人强制参保规定能够服务的三个不同政策目标。具体而言,强制参保规定的支持者可能希望它能够:(1)为未参保者提供更强的健康和财务保障(“家长主义”);(2)消除医疗服务提供和融资中的低效率(“效率”);以及/或者(3)要求健康者购买保险,以帮助为患病者的医疗护理提供资金(“健康再分配”)。健康再分配——本文的主要关注点——是通过风险共担机制将财富从健康者转移到患病者。许多人将健康再分配视为一种手段,使所有美国人能够基于需求而非支付能力或意愿更公平地获得医疗护理。借鉴2006年马萨诸塞州医疗改革中个人强制参保规定的实施证据,本文揭示,分散的美国医疗保险市场将阻碍该强制参保规定实现这些目标的能力——尤其是健康再分配目标。分散是指保险市场被细分为众多风险池,这是由市场竞争和监管驱动的。它使美国人无法广泛分担健康状况不佳的风险,并且这样做会巩固一个医疗护理获取仍与支付能力和个体特征挂钩的体系。本文最后一部分探讨了各种政策,包括新法律中的一些政策(如保险监管和保险交易所)以及其他政策(如扩大公共保险),如何能够减少分散状况,以便强制参保规定能够成功实现所有期望的目标,并在此过程中随着时间推移获得更大的合法性。