University of California, Berkeley, USA.
Bioethics. 2012 Feb;26(2):108-16. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01817.x. Epub 2010 May 17.
There is an important gap in philosophical, clinical and bioethical conceptions of decision-making capacity. These fields recognize that when traumatic life circumstances occur, people not only feel afraid and demoralized, but may develop catastrophic thinking and other beliefs that can lead to poor judgment. Yet there has been no articulation of the ways in which such beliefs may actually derail decision-making capacity. In particular, certain emotionally grounded beliefs are systematically unresponsive to evidence, and this can block the ability to deliberate about alternatives. People who meet medico-legal criteria for decision-making capacity can react to health and personal crises with such capacity-derailing reactions. One aspect of this is that a person who is otherwise cognitively intact may be unable to appreciate her own future quality of life while in this complex state of mind. This raises troubling ethical challenges. We cannot rely on the current standard assessment of cognition to determine decisional rights in medical and other settings. We need to understand better how emotionally grounded beliefs interfere with decision-making capacity, in order to identify when caregivers have an obligation to intervene.
在决策能力的哲学、临床和生物伦理概念中存在一个重要的差距。这些领域认识到,当创伤性的生活环境发生时,人们不仅感到害怕和士气低落,而且可能会产生灾难性的思维和其他信念,从而导致判断力下降。然而,还没有人阐明这些信念实际上是如何破坏决策能力的。特别是,某些基于情绪的信念对证据是系统地无反应的,这可能会阻碍对替代方案进行审议的能力。符合医学法律决策能力标准的人可能会对健康和个人危机做出这种破坏决策能力的反应。其中一个方面是,一个在认知上完整的人在这种复杂的心态下可能无法理解自己未来的生活质量。这引发了令人不安的伦理挑战。我们不能依靠当前对认知的标准评估来确定医疗和其他环境中的决策权利。我们需要更好地了解基于情绪的信念如何干扰决策能力,以便确定护理人员何时有义务进行干预。